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Approved For Release 2005/08/02: CIA-RDP81B00080R001400250002-8 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Deputy	Director	for	National	Foreign	Assessment
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TO SEAPE DE

MEMO FOR: Director, Program and Budget Office Resource Management Office SUBJECT: Additional House Appropriations Committee Questions Attached is our response to the additional House Appropriations Committee questions. Robert R. Bowie P. S. Jan WA clear by what process these Committee submit-them Distribution: 1 - Addressee 1 - D/NFAC 1 - NFAC Reg 1 - NIO/SP1 - DD/OSI 1 - C/RES

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DCI/RM-79-1677

JIR 2 9 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Robert R. Bowie

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

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FROM:

Director, Program and Budget Office

Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT:

Additional House Appropriations Committee Questions (U)

- 1. We have received the attached additional questions for the record from the staff of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. These are in regard to the DCI's 27 March appearance before the committee where he presented the NFIP overview of our fiscal year 1980 budget request. (U)
- 2. Will you please arrange for the preparation of appropriate answers for this question set to be returned to the Resource Management Staff by 13 April. You will note that several of the questions will require DoD observations. Therefore, will you please ensure that your staff solicits a DoD input where required. (U)

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Memo and Questions from Chief, Surveys and Investigations Staff, HAC

Memo is unclassified when separated from attachments.

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02: CIA-RDP81B00080R001400250002-8 March 23, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN

RE: National Intelligence Estimates

I have been advised that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is scheduled to appear before the Committee next week. The Investigative Staff is currently conducting a study of the procedures used by the U.S. Government to produce national and defense intelligence estimates of the military forces which constitute or may constitute in the future threats to the security of this country.

We are in the process of preparing two reports for the Committee which address this subject, however, they will not be completed at the time the DCI testifies before the Committee. Therefore, the following questions are being submitted for the Committee's consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

C. R. Anderson

Chief of the Surveys and Investigations Staff

House Appropriations Committee

MEMORAN DON'O YEAR FOR Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP81B00080R001400250002-8

Re: National Intelligence Estimates

The following is prepared for possible use during the scheduled appearance before the Committee of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

COMMENT:

Executive Order No. 12036, dated January 24, 1978, makes clear the consumers' primary responsibility to establish requirements and priorities for the intelligence community's collection and production of national foreign intelligence. The National Intelligence Topics (NITs) developed by the policymakers, and approved by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, of which the DCI is chairman, are the formal expression of these consumer priorities. In addition, the DCI has issued a directive, DCID 1/2, captioned "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities." This directive originates within the intelligence community and is intended to reflect the relative importance of topical information on foreign countries to policy formulation planning and operations of the NSC, its members, and other Federal agencies. During the Investigative Staff's current inquiry concerning national intelligence estimates it was not possible to evaluate the intelligence community's response to NITs because the NITs were characterized as representing privileged policymaker decisons and as such were not available for perusal. Various representatives of the intelligence community advised the Investigative Staff that both the NITs and DCID 1/2 were ineffective in giving guidance as to the production and collection of national foreign intelligence.

QUESTIONS:

- 1. If the Legislative Branch is to make a meaningful evaluation of the intelligence community's responsiveness to the needs of its users will you advise as to the rationale for declaring the NITs to be privileged decisions of policymakers as to their intelligence requirements and priorities?
- 2. Can you show how the RITs are factually (rather than "technically") translated as requirements and priorities on the intelligence community's production and collection of intelligence in response thereto?

- 3. Approved For Release 2005/08/02: CIA-RDP81B00080R001400250002-8 what procedures are there for Insuring that the real world of intelligence operations there is adherence to the intent of Executive Order No. 12036 which makes it the consumers' primary responsibility to set priorities for the intelligence community which are implemented through the NITs process; or are intelligence requirements and priorities established by the intelligence community based on what it assumes are the policymakers' needs as was the case in the preparation of Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), the predecessor to the NITs?
- 4. What are the procedures used for insuring priorities as established in DCID 1/2 are consistent with those set forth in the NITs?
- 5. Can you show how the NITs and DCID 1/2 are effective in prioritizing collection requirements, or are the prerogatives of the collection asset manager the principle factor affecting tasking priorities?

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Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP81B00080R001400250002-8 COMMENT:

Numerous newspaper and other articles have commented to the effect the DCI is unduly influencing the preparation of national intelligence estimates to insure they are consistent with or support current administration policy. During the Investigative Staff's review of national intelligence estimates an attempt was made to evaluate the manner in which differences of opinion were resolved during the preparation of such estimates. A meaningful evaluation was not possible because the Investigative Staff was not permitted to peruse drafts containing handwritten notations of the DCT suggesting additions, revisions, or deletions. All drafts, and any related comments by the DCI, outside consultants, or team members involved in the preparation of the national intelligence estimates were considered as internal working papers and as such were not available for review.

QUESTION:

What assurance can you give the Committee that the review procedures involved in the preparation of national intelligence estimates insure the estimates are in fact based on the best available intelligence and objective analysis thereof, and such estimates cannot be unduly influenced to project a parochial interest?